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T
his article reviews the development of broad-
band Internet access throughout the European
Union.Based on international experience,it discuss-
es challenges for policy and regulation in telecom-
munications markets, in particular in the light of the
emergence of IP-based telephony (VoIP).
The European Commission views broadband as a
key ingredient of competitiveness in Europe, and
has been active in promoting developments in
broadband. This appears, for instance, in the
Lisbon 2010 goals, which pay explicit attention to
the take-up of broadband.Although such goals are,
in principle, praiseworthy, it is important to relate
them to the nature and effectiveness of competi-
tion and regulation in the markets in which broad-
band plays a role. This article links recent experi-
ence in broadband to the telecommunications sec-
tor, and points to a couple of important policy con-
siderations.
We briefly mention some related papers. For back-
ground on the regulatory framework in the EU, we
refer to De Bijl and Peitz (2005), who focus mainly
on local loop unbundling (LLU) and related regu-
latory issues. For economic analysis of the link
between regulation and the effectiveness of com-
petition in telecommunications, see De Bijl and
Peitz (2002). On the relationship between LLU
regulation and the incentives for investments
in competing infrastructure, see for instance
Bourreau and Dogan (2005). Papers that present
empirical results on the up-take of broadband
include Gruber and Denni (2005) and Distaso,
Lupi and Manenti (2004).
We will start by looking back at what has happened
in telecoms markets and by explaining the relevance
of broadband developments. Based on data and
country experiences in the EU and beyond, we then
discuss the international development of broadband
Internet access, in particular in relationship to the
market for telecommunications services. Finally, we
discuss some challenges for policy and regulation.
Telecommunications markets
A major promise of the liberalisation of telecommu-
nications markets was competition between net-
works, enabled by the rollout of new networks as
well as by the upgrading of cable networks. Both
local network rollout as well as upgrading by cable
operators was initially disappointing, however, at
least in the light of initial expectations. Local net-
work investments have been narrowly targeted, as
they were mainly aimed at corporate customers in
business districts or metropolitan areas more gener-
ally. Residential customers, especially in rural areas,
have hardly experienced the rollout of competing
local loops to their houses. Cable operators have
been inactive for some time. However, due to LLU,
broadband Internet access and voice telephony over
the Internet, the telecoms industry is now undergo-
ing important changes.
To a certain extent, residential customers benefited
from entry made possible by mandated access to
incumbents’ networks, as in the case of carrier
(pre)selection (CS, CPS) and LLU.1 Arguably, ini-
tially LLU failed to give a strong push to competi-
tion in markets for fixed voice telephony.2 Entrants
leasing unbundled local lines from incumbents
mainly used them to offer only broadband Internet
access based on digital subscriber line (DSL) tech-
nology. They could do so by purchasing relatively
“plain”types of unbundled lines,which are less suit-
ed for offering (traditional) voice telephony.3
However, with the emergence of telephony based
on the Internet Protocol (IP), the picture is chang-
ing, as voice services can be offered over “plain”
broadband lines.
CESifo DICE Report 3/2006 10
Forum
* Paul de Bijl: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Research, PO Box 80510, 2508 GM Den Haag, Netherlands, also
affiliated with the ENCORE fellows network; paul.de.bijl@cpb.nl.
Martin Peitz: University of Mannheim and International
University in Germany, address: School of Business
Administration, International University in Germany, 76646
Bruchsal, Germany, also affiliated with ENCORE and CESifo;
Martin.Peitz@i-u.de.
This article was written while Paul de Bijl was at TILEC (Tilburg
Law and Economics Center),Tilburg University.
1 In terms of required investment levels, LLU-based entry can be
seen as an intermediate entry mode between pure access-based
entry (CS and CPS) and complete facilities-based entry.LLU gives
entrants more control over the types and quality of services that
they provide to end-users.
2 See Delgado et al. (2004).
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A somewhat similar comment can be made for cable
operators.While most have remained (more or less)
passive in offering traditional voice telephony over
their networks, many of them have not hesitated to
offer broadband Internet access.And here again,IP-
based telephony now allows them to offer voice ser-
vices over broadband lines. Accordingly, even if
cable operators’ activities, similar to the supply of
voice telephony by entrants using unbundled lines,
have been disappointing in several countries, IP-
based telephony may drastically change the picture
in the coming years.
Recent developments in broadband access
Background
The main types of broadband access technologies
are digital subscriber line (DSL),cable modem,fibre
to the home (FTTH),and wireless local loop (WLL).
DSL is typically offered by network operators, such
as incumbents who have upgraded their PSTN
(Public Switched Telephone Network) networks and
by operators who use incumbent’s local networks
through LLU. In addition to these types, there are
various other means of broadband access, such as
satellite and power line communication. Depending
on the speed that can be reached, mobile technolo-
gies may also be relevant, such as the third genera-
tion of mobile telephony (UMTS), WiFi and
WiMAX.4
Broadband is typically defined as allowing for
incoming traffic at a rate of at least 256 kB per sec-
ond. Since existing FTTH connections already man-
age more than 30 MB per second, a more detailed
look at broadband connections that distinguish
between different speeds would be desirable.This is
particularly the case because certain services,such as
video-on-demand, only become attractive at suffi-
ciently high broadband speeds.
Apart from faster downloads (and uploads) that
make existing services more attractive, and also lead
to the introduction of new services, broadband
access offers an alternative to traditional telephony
in the form of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP).
The main types of IP-based voice services which are
available for end-users are:
1. Voice over Broadband (VoB), managed by a
broadband provider (DSL or cable operator);
2. VoB managed by an independent service
provider;
3. VoIP as an application on a PC connected to the
Internet (e.g. Skype).
Throughout this article, we will simply use “VoIP”
for all of these types of IP-based telephony.
Interestingly, to a large extent VoIP still has to be
addressed by policy makers,both at the national and
European level, as safeguarding the development of
this innovative service calls for reviewing legal
frameworks. Various EU members states, including
Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Italy,
Luxembourg, Austria, Finland and the UK, have
already issued or are currently discussing guidelines
on the regulatory treatment of VoIP. For example, in
Luxembourg and the UK, numbering plans have
been changed to eliminate legal constraints on VoIP
services. In the last section we will discuss the regu-
latory challenges that still lie ahead of us in the light
of the emergence of VoIP.
Recent developments in the broadband market5
At the moment, broadband connections are primar-
ily meant for Internet access. Worldwide, (narrow-
band) dial-up access to the Internet is in decline, as
subscribers are migrating to broadband access.6 DSL
is the main force driving this migration,also in coun-
tries in which cable modems have traditionally
played important roles – we will come back to this
issue below. It should be noted here that moving
beyond Internet alone, broadband is used more and
more for bundles of Internet and fixed telephony
(more on this later), possibly with TV added as well
(“triple play”). Mobile telephony is being added as
well by operators who have the necessary capabili-
ties (“quadruple play”).
The penetration rate of broadband access is growing
at a fast rate. In October 2005, the penetration rate
was 11.5 percent of the EU population,amounting to
more than 50 million users with a residential con-
nection.One year earlier,it was only 7.3 percent.The
4 Wifi and WiMAX are standards-based technologies for wireless
local area networks (WLAN) and last mile wireless broadband
access.
5 Throughout this section, for EU member states we will use data
from the European Commission (2006a, b). For OECD member
states outside of the EU, we will use OECD data for December
2005, available at http://www.oecd.org/sti/ict/broadband. Note that
these types of data may not be fully comparable:definitions may be
somewhat different, and dates of observation are not exactly the
same.
6 Le Floch (2006).growth has obviously not been the same for all mem-
ber states, as can be seen in Figure 1; it ranges from
1 percent in Greece to almost 24 percent in the
Netherlands.
Outside of the EU, Korea was traditionally in the
lead in terms of broadband penetration (25 percent
in 2005) but was recently overtaken by Iceland
(27 percent in 2005).Note that the EU’s frontrunner,
the Netherlands, lags behind but not by much.
Interestingly, Korea’s growth rate has levelled off
recently. Based on the declining growth observed in
Korea, one may expect that for the leaders in the
EU, Denmark and the Netherlands, broadband pen-
etration growth will become substantially less steep
in the coming years.
The Table gives an overview of the composition of
broadband technologies in the majority of the EU
member states. On average in the EU, DSL has a
share of 81 percent of fixed broadband connections.
Cable is next, with 17 percent. In terms of growth, a
similar difference appears: DSL had a growth rate of
61.5 percent, and cable 39.2 percent.7 Within the EU,
there are big differences in the composition of broad-
band connections. Countries with a strong cable sec-
tor are, for instance, the Netherlands (38 percent),
Denmark (29 percent),Belgium (38 percent),Austria
(41 percent) and Portugal (42 percent).
Looking at the composition of
broadband connections related
to its overall penetration,OECD
data shows that there is a posi-
tive correlation between the
share of cable and broadband
penetration.8 One interpretation
of this relationship is that the
(historical) presence of cable
networks contributed to the ear-
ly take-up of broadband, provid-
ed that cable operators upgraded
their networks. In particular,
cable operators providing broad-
band access constitute com-
petition to dial-up and broad-
band Internet access offered by
telephone operators.As we discuss below,subsequent
growth may then partly be due to the presence of
DSL in combination with LLU.
Technologies other than DSL and cable currently
still have little significance. Some operators are
investing in FTTH and WLL. FTTH is in third place
in the EU, due to relatively high penetration rates in
Sweden, Estonia and Lithuania. WLL is used by
entrants in, among others, Lithuania, Ireland and
Latvia. Since in some member states, governments
are tendering WLL licenses or are planning to do so,
WLL is likely to become more important. Another
promising technology (or rather, approach) is






































































Source: European Commission (2006b).
BROADBAND PENETRATION RATE IN EUROPE
1
st October 2005 in %
Figure 1
7 European Commission (2006a, p. 34).
8 The correlation coefficient is 0.25 for all countries in the set, and
0.36 if Iceland is excluded.Iceland has the highest penetration rate,
but a cable share of 0.4 percent.Empirical analyses that control for
other factors such as income and population density are e.g.Gruber
and Denni (2005) for the US (using state level panel data) and
Distaso et al. (2004) for European countries. In these analyses our
observation that the degree of facilities-based competition and
broadband penetration are positively correlated is confirmed.
Composition of broadband technologies in
different countries
December 2005 in %
DSL Cable Other
Netherlands 62.0  38.0 0.0 
Denmark 61.3  28.9 9.8 
Finland 86.8  12.7 0.6 
Norway 81.3  13.2 5.5 
Sweden 65.6  16.9 17.5 
Belgium 61.8  38.2 0.0 
United Kingdom 72.3  27.6 0.1 
France 94.0  5.9  0.1 
Luxembourg 89.1 10.6 0.3
Austria 57.4  41.3 1.3 
Germany 97.1  2.2  0.6 
Italy 95.1  0.0  4.9 
Spain 78.4  21.1 0.5 
Portugal 57.6  42.2 0.2 
Ireland 74.7  9.2  16.0 
Czech Republic 47.5 21.2 31.2
Hungary 64.6  33.2 2.3 
Slovak Republic 78.4  15.5 6.0 
Poland 67.7  30.1 2.2 
Greece 99.1  0.0  0.9 
OECD 62.0 32.3 5.7
EU 15 81.3 16.9 1.8
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“metro Ethernet”,which consists of connecting indi-
vidual apartments by Ethernet cables in order to use
jointly a dedicated switch with a broadband link
(which may be DSL, cable, FTTH etc.).9
It should be noted that according to European
Commission (2006a), the EU is not a frontrunner in
terms of broadband speed.This is due to the fact that
new DSL technologies and new wireless technolo-
gies (e.g.WiMAX) are taken up rather slowly, or are
still in a trial phase.
Given its strong relative position (see Table), DSL
can be seen as the main driving force behind the
migration to broadband. The strong growth in DSL
lines is possibly driven by (regulated) LLU-based
entry, which has stimulated competition in the DSL
segment. Interestingly, countries with a high broad-
band penetration not only have a high share of cable
but often are also characterized by well developed
regulation of access for LLU and bitstream access.10
The view that access regulation is good for competi-
tion has been questioned in a number of papers, in
particular with respect to more intrusive types of
unbundling such as bitstream access and sub-loop
unbundling. For instance, Wallsten (2006) ran cross-
country regressions for OECD countries from 1999
to 2003 and regressed broadband penetration on
variables that represent the current regulatory
regime as well as other relevant variables such as
population density. At a first look, LLU in the form
of full unbundling appears to be significantly corre-
lated with broadband penetration. However, includ-
ing fixed effects, he found that in the case of LLU,
coefficients are,in general,ambiguous and in the case
of sub-loop unbundling negative and statistically sig-
nificant.
Note that regression results with
respects to the regulatory vari-
ables have to be interpreted
carefully because of an endo-
geneity problem. For instance, if
regression results indicate that
the presence of a particular type
of regulation, such as bitstream
access or sub-loop unbundling,
has a statistically significant negative effect,then this
does not necessarily mean that the use of such regu-
lation will have a negative effect on broadband pen-
etration.The causality may go the other way,namely
in countries in which broadband penetration appears
disappointing (for instance because of the lack of
feasible facilities-based competition such as cable),
policy makers and regulators opt for more intrusive
regulation to foster broadband penetration. At this
point the empirical evidence appears to us to be
inconclusive as to the effect of different types of
unbundling regulation on broadband penetration.11
An interesting claim in this debate is that cable com-
panies,whose broadband activities tend to be unreg-
ulated, invested more quickly in their broadband
networks than telephone companies did (see e.g.
Hazlett 2005). Indeed in a number of European
countries some cable operators were the first to offer
broadband connections. However, it is not clear
whether this is due to different regulatory regimes or
due to the fact that for telephone companies’ broad-
band connections cannibalized on dial-up connec-
tions resulting in lower incentives to invest early
irrespective of regulation. According to this latter
view, once cable companies posed a real threat tele-
phone companies had to react.
The typical regulatory pattern in EU member states
that have reviewed the markets notified by the
European Commission – which is about half of the
member states – has been as follows. In general, in
the relevant markets for wholesale unbundled access
and wholesale broadband access,national regulatory
authorities (NRAs) have established that competi-
tion is not yet effective. This triggered various, but
































































October 2004 October 2005
Source: European Commission (2006b).
MARKET SHARES OF ENTRANTS IN FIXED BROADBAND RETAIL LINE
in %
Figure 2
9 European Commission (2006a).
10 European Commission (2006a, p. 36).
11 Apart from a proper treatment of the
endogeneity problem we would like to
see analyses with more recent data since
broadband penetration has increased
quite dramatically since 2003.ular bitstream and LLU. So far there has been no
regulation of bitstream access in the Czech Republic,
Germany, Estonia, Greece, Luxembourg, Latvia,
Malta, Poland, and Slovakia, while the appeal courts
in Sweden have suspended the relevant regulation.
Interventions aiming at mandatory access are likely
to have contributed to substantial increases of
entrants’ market shares, as depicted in Figure 2. One
can see that on average in the EU, the incumbent’s
market share in the broadband market has declined
to about 50 percent in October 2005.
As can be seen from Figure 3, within the DSL seg-
ment,the average market share of incumbents is still
61 percent. Thus, in countries where cable networks
suitable for broadband are absent or play a minor
role,on average,incumbents have been able to main-
tain stronger positions in the overall broadband mar-
ket. At the individual level, this is confirmed, for
example, by Italy (incumbent’s market share in
broadband 70 percent) and, to a lesser extent, by
Germany, where the reduction of the incumbent’s
market share is a very recent phenomenon (incum-
bent’s market share in broadband was 86 percent in
October 2004 and 65 percent in October 2005).
From the perspective of developing competition,the
general observation from Figures 2 and 3 is that
incumbents’ markets shares are in decline, which
may imply that competition is becoming more
intense. According to European Commission
(2006a), the increase in competition is one of the
most important forces behind the rollout and take-
up of broadband. However, given that competition
(and investments in network infrastructure) are
partly affected by regulation,regulatory intervention
(in particular, with respect to LLU) may play an
important role in industry development, but its net
welfare effect is hard to assess.
Challenges for policy and regulation
Our observations give rise to various policy chal-
lenges.Firstly,broadband penetration should not be a
goal in itself, given that it is uncertain to what extent
consumers wish to have fast broadband connections
that can increasingly be used for demanding, innova-
tive services, such as movies on demand and online
games. In some countries there may be little demand
for such advanced products while consumers are
more interested in decent speed at low prices. In
other words, policy makers need to develop an
understanding of the preferences of end-users,poten-
tially even about services which do not yet exist.
A second challenge is related to the regulation of
LLU. As observed above, there may be a link
between the fact that DSL entry is stimulated by the
regulatory framework in several member states and
broadband take-up. This link may make it hard for
policy makers to let go of LLU regulation, even
though from a dynamic efficiency perspective, that
might be desirable.The reason is that LLU is part of
the broader issue of infrastructure-based versus
retail-based competition: in the longer run, infra-
structure-based competition is likely to require less
regulatory intervention and, therefore, the social
costs of regulation appears to be smaller. What is
optimal will depend on the preferences of end-users
and the economic costs for undertaking investments
in networks, which depend on country factors (e.g.
geography, GDP) as well as
telecommunications specific
factors (e.g. the existence of
cable networks).
A third challenge, or rather set
of challenges, is due to VoIP
(which is, in turn, driven by
broadband). Of course, NRAs
have to address how they
should regulate VoIP (see De
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Turkey and the US have
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Source: European Commission (2006b).
MARKET SHARES OF INCUMBENTS
 IN DSL RETAIL LINE in %
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imposed minimum or no regulations specific to VoIP
services, at least so far.12 Other countries, including
Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Greece,
Iceland, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK,
view VoIP services offered to the public as a
telecommunications service, which is then subject to
regulations as those for traditional PSTN services.13
In addition to the issue of regulation of VoIP itself,
we want to stress that NRAs have to be aware of
potential distortions caused by existing PSTN regu-
lation of the emergence of VoIP. Higher prices for
terminating access to the PSTN network slow down
the adoption of VoIP and reduce the profits of
entrants that exclusively offer exclusively VoIP tele-
phony (De Bijl and Peitz 2006).Thus regulators have
to think beyond the framework of “traditionally”
defined markets and take interactions between (con-
verging) markets into account in order to avoid
interventions that lead to welfare losses.
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